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Abstract:  This paper argues that an evolutionary view of learning provides an explanatory logic for 
knowledge-based and capabilities-based theories of the firm. The paper develops a rigorous treatment 
of organizational learning as an evolutionary process on the basis of the notion of ‘generalized 
Darwinism’ and its application to knowledge. A Darwinian view of organizational learning 
demonstrates the logical imperative of distinguishing between organizational knowledge and 
organizational capabilities, and of understanding organizational learning in terms of the interplay 
between them. Work by Nelson and Winter, Penrose, and Burgelman is reinterpreted in Darwinian 
terms and implications for the nature of organizational capabilities and the locus of organizational 
knowledge are derived. 
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Knowledge-based, competence and capabilities-based, and dynamic capabilities views have become 
increasingly popular in both organizational economics and the managerial literature (cf. Dosi, Nelson 
and Winter 2000; Helfat 2003). What these theories share is a view of the firm as a repository of 
productive knowledge. But where does this knowledge come from? The answer, presumably, is that 
productive knowledge is the result of organizational learning. But how do organizations learn? And 
where does the resulting organizational knowledge reside? 
 
Because of their respective theoretical aims, the different streams of theory development that have 
adopted a view of the firm as a repository of productive knowledge have given limited attention to 
learning as the basis of such knowledge. Evolutionary economics aims to explain population level 
phenomena (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982), the knowledge-based view aims to explain the existence 
of firms (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1992; Foss, 1993, 1996; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996), and the 
resource-based and dynamic capabilities views of the firm aim to explain performance differentials 
between them (e.g. Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). Understanding productive 
knowledge as the result of an organizational learning process is secondary to these aims. 
 
This paper explores organizational knowledge and learning from the perspective of evolutionary 
theory. Capturing the process of organizational learning and the nature of the knowledge that results 
from it is a major challenge for theory construction. Simple unidirectional causal explanations at a 
single level of analysis fall short of capturing the feedback loops and multi-level dynamics that are 
central to learning. Note that knowledge, the dependent variable of a theory of organizational learning, 
is a state of the organization, and that this state results from the process of learning. In other words, 
the explanation of knowledge does not rest on an independent variable (or a set of those variables), but 
rather on a process in time. This calls for another causal logic than the typical explanation of the type 
‘X causes Y’. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that the explanatory logic of Darwin’s theory of evolution 
offers a way to deal with the theoretical complications inherent in conceptualizing learning. As the 
paper will show, a generalized version of Darwinism is especially well suited to capture the multi-
level dynamics and feedback loops that are central to learning. It will be argued that firms can be 
usefully modeled as ‘Darwin machines’ that develop productive knowledge as the result of learning 
processes that can be understood in terms of the Darwinian variation-selection-retention algorithm. 
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Darwinism can thus be seen as a way to ground knowledge-based and capabilities-based theories in an 
explanatory logic that is uniquely capable of addressing the dynamics of organizational learning. 
 
The crucial insight that can be derived from the application of the Darwinian logic to organizational 
learning is the logical imperative to disentangle organizational knowledge and organizational 
capabilities. The causal structure of Darwinism captures the relationship between organizational 
knowledge and organizational capabilities, and demonstrates that organizational learning can only be 
fully understood in terms of the interplay between them. 
 
The paper develops a generalized evolutionary explanation of learning that is subsequently used to 
reinterpret Nelson and Winter (1982), Penrose (1959) and Burgelman (1991) in terms of the 
Darwinian logic. We show that the seminal work of Nelson and Winter fails to make the necessary 
distinction between knowledge and capabilities, and contrast it with the work of Penrose and 
Burgelman. While the work of none of these authors meets all of the necessary criteria for a Darwinian 
theory of organizational learning, each of them provides essential building blocks for a theory that can 
meet the logical criteria of a Darwinian explanation. The paper discusses these building blocks and 
how they can be combined, and derives implications for the nature and locus of a firm’s productive 
knowledge. 
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2. LEARNING AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 
 
The first section of the paper develops a Darwinian view of learning. The argument that organizational 
learning can be understood as an evolutionary process is based on the notion of ‘generalized 
Darwinism’ and its application to knowledge. We first explain the idea of generalized Darwinism. We 
then turn to its application to knowledge and explain the concept of a ‘Darwin machine’. The section 
concludes with a general framework that captures the Darwinian view of learning and demonstrates 
the crucial distinction between knowledge and behavior. 
 
2.1. Generalized Darwinism 
Generalized Darwinism is the idea that the explanatory structure that is central to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution applies to the evolution of all open, complex systems(Campbell, 1960, 1965; Lewontin, 
1970; Cziko, 1995; Dennett, 1995; Hull et al. 2001; Hodgson, 2002; Knudsen, 2002; Stoelhorst, 
2005a; Hodgson and Knudsen, forthcoming). A complex system can be defined as a system that is 
composed of a number of interacting elements (cf. Simon 1981). An open system can be defined as a 
system that requires resources from its environment to function. Firms are open, complex systems, and 
if we accept the claim of generalized Darwinism, it follows that their evolution can be explained in 
Darwinian terms. 
 
So what, exactly, is the nature of Darwin’s theory? In its most general form, a Darwinian theory of 
evolution involves mechanisms to introduce variations, a consistent selection process, and 
mechanisms for preserving and/or propagating the selected variants (Campbell, 1960, 1965; Plotkin, 
1994). The claim of generalized Darwinism is that the explanatory structure of the triumvirate of 
‘variation’, ‘selection’ and ‘retention’ holds across domains. In itself, the Darwinian logic is substrate 
neutral, and the specific mechanisms of variation, selection and retention can be expected to differ 
between systems. In general, a Darwinian theory can therefore be understood as a specification of how 
variation, selection and retention work for the system in question. 
 
The idea that Darwin’s theory may be applied outside biological evolution has a long history.1 In 
strategy and organization studies, it has been taken up and applied to firms by scholars from a variety 
of disciplinary backgrounds (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979, 1999; Weick, 1979; 
                                                     
1 It starts with Darwin himself, who applied it to the evolution of language, includes Social Darwinism, the 
movement that has brought it into disrepute, and more recently, Sociobiology, Evolutionary Psychology, and 
Memetics. For a balanced review of these different strands of evolutionary theorizing see Laland and Brown 
(2002). 
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Nelson and Winter, 1982; Burgelman, 1991; Baum and Singh, 1994; Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). 
Most of these applications either use Darwinism as a metaphor for the competition between firms, or 
take inspiration from analogies to biological evolution to elucidate how firms change over time. But 
generalized Darwinism is not based on biological metaphors or analogies, but on the claim that on a 
sufficiently general level of abstraction all evolutionary processes are ontologically similar (cf. 
Hodgson, 2002; Hodgson and Knudsen, forthcoming). In the words of Plotkin: ‘The actual 
mechanisms in each case, of course – and one cannot repeat this point often enough – are entirely 
different’ (1994, p.100, emphasis in original). But the explanatory structure provided by Darwin is 
universal and holds regardless of the nature of variation or the mechanisms for retaining favorable 
variations. 
 
This claim extends to situations were human intentionality is involved. The classic objection to the 
application of Darwinism in the social sciences is that intelligent agents would change the 
evolutionary dynamic that Darwin set out to explain. In nature, variation is random, which is to say 
that it is blind to the selection pressures that the organism faces. This feature of biological evolution 
has long been a reason to call economic evolution Lamarckian (Penrose 1952; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Humans can be expected to vary their behavior in a way that does reflect the selection pressures 
they face, so that cultural evolution can be expected to involve directed, rather than blind, variation. 
Moreover, cultural evolution allows the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or in other words, of 
adaptations that were not encoded in genes but emerged during an organism’s lifetime, something that 
is impossible in nature. But there is nothing about generalized Darwinism to stipulate that all 
evolutionary processes should involve blind variation, nor that they cannot involve the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics (Knudsen 2001; Hodgson 2001). All that is needed is a mechanism for the 
replenishment of variety, whatever the form, and a mechanism to selectively retain the variations that 
work. 
 
As Dennett (1995) has pointed out, a Darwinian explanation is in essence an algorithmic explanation: 
if there is a consistent selection process, and if there are mechanisms for introducing variations and 
retaining the favorable ones, evolution will occur. What has received much less attention in the 
applications of Darwinism in economics and organization theory is what the phrase ‘evolution will 
occur’ means. Its most basic interpretation is simply that the system in question changes over time, 
and this is the way in which the term is typically used by economists and management scholars. But 
Darwin’s theory does more than explain how change can come about. It explains adaptive fit, or why 
systems are so remarkably well adapted to the environments in which they function (Stoelhorst, 
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2005b). It is this feature of Darwin’s theory that makes it relevant to understanding organizational 
learning. 
 
2.2. Learning as a Darwinian Process 
Barring on omniscient designer, the variation-selection-retention logic of generalized Darwinism is the 
only logically consistent and complete explanation to account for adaptive fit. Adaptive fit is the state 
that allows an open, complex system to extract the resources necessary for survival from its 
environment, and may involve any number of adaptations to that environment. Adaptations are simply 
features of the system that allow it to function successfully. They come about through the interplay of 
mechanisms to introduce variation in the ways a system interacts with its environment, a consistent 
selection process, and mechanisms to retain those variations that work. The effect of the interaction of 
the three Darwinian mechanisms will be that the system in question is a quite literal sense informed by 
its environment (Plotkin, 1994). 
 
Adaptations can thus be understood as beneficial features of a system shaped by interaction with the 
environment. Two features of adaptations are important. The first is their goal-directed nature. Every 
adaptation is ‘for’ something. The second is their relational quality. Every adaptation is some form of 
organization of the system relative to some feature of environmental order. Adaptations simply cannot 
be seen in isolation from the environmental factors that have provided the selection pressures for them. 
The goal-directed property of adaptations can only result if adaptations are ‘in-formed’ by features of 
the world; ‘they are highly directed kinds of organization, and not random, transient structures that 
may or may not work. Adaptations do work, and they work precisely because of this ‘in-forming’ 
relationship between organismic organization and some aspect of the order of the world’ (Plotkin 
1994, p.118). 
 
Plotkin (1994) convincingly argues that given these two characteristics adaptations and knowledge are 
essentially the same thing. ‘[A]ll adaptations are instances of knowledge, and human knowledge [as 
commonly understood] is a special kind of adaptation’ (p.117). His argument builds on a longer 
tradition in the branch of philosophy known as evolutionary epistemology (Campbell 1974; Popper 
1972) and proceeds in three steps: (1) knowledge as commonly understood is a way of ‘incorporating’ 
aspects of the world; (2) the human capacity to gain knowledge is a biological adaptation that needs an 
evolutionary explanation; (3) adaptations are themselves ways of incorporating the world into the 
structure and organization of living things. The conclusion is that ‘adaptations are biological 
knowledge, and knowledge as we commonly understand the word is a special case of biological 
knowledge’ (p.xv). 
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The insight that adaptations are a form of knowledge, and knowledge as commonly understood a form 
of adaptation, is central to the argument that learning is an evolutionary process. If learning is the 
process that leads to knowledge and evolution the process that leads to adaptations, then equating 
knowledge and adaptations means that learning is an evolutionary process. In keeping with the tenets 
of evolutionary epistemology and generalized Darwinism, it follows that the Darwinian logic can 
explain the process of learning. 
 
Plotkin (1994) uses the concept of a ‘Darwin machine’ to underscore the point that learning is an 
evolutionary process.2 A Darwin machine is any system whose transformation over time through 
successive adaptive states is explained by a process of variation, selection and retention. Populations 
of entities without any capacity for individual learning can function as a Darwin machine, as long as 
selective pressure from the environment affects the differential propagation of these entities over time. 
This is how natural selection in biology works on populations. Variations in the genotype of the 
population lead to differences in the phenotypes that constitute the population, and the genetic 
information of the phenotypes that do not reproduce is lost, while the genetic information of those 
phenotypes that do successfully reproduce is retained. In other words, natural selection causes 
differential reproduction and thus provides the necessary feedback loop to make the Darwinian 
algorithm work. 
 
There are, in fact, a number of other systems that can be understood as Darwin machines and that have 
been described as such. These include the immune system, the brain, and the scientific enterprise 
(Plotkin 1994; Cziko 1995; Dennett 1995; Hull et al. 2001). The tenets of generalized Darwinism 
suggest that if different types of individual learning can be understood as a Darwinian process, we 
may follow a similar route when modeling organizational learning. After all, organizations, like 
organisms, are open complex systems that depend on scarce resources from the environment to 
survive. Modeling organizational learning as a Darwinian process that leads to behavioral adaptations 
would ground theories of organizational learning in a proven logic that was specifically developed for 
a multi-level process involving feedback loops. But before we undertake this task, we need to further 
clarify the nature of this logic. 
 
                                                     
2 Plotkin credits William H. Calvin for coining the term ‘Darwin machine’. 
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2.3. The Explanatory Structure of Darwinism 
The notion of adaptation (note that we are here referring to the noun, not the verb), is closely linked to 
functional explanation, which has had its share of criticism because it can easily lead to evolutionary 
‘just-so’ stories that reek of Panglossian pan-adaptationism where ‘everything is for the best in the 
best of all possible worlds’. A normal scientific explanation would explain a phenomenon in terms of 
its cause, whereas a functional explanation explains the features of a system (say, the wings of a bird) 
in terms of its function (flight). Vromen (1995, p.90-91) discusses the classic objection to functional 
explanations of the existence of a feature, which hinges on the recognition that functions are not 
causes but effects. A functional explanation therefore seems to reverse the logic of cause and effect: 
flight does not cause wings, it is having wings that makes flight possible. The problem is that wings 
are a sufficient, but not necessary condition for flight: there may well be functional equivalents that 
could have provided the same function. 
 
Let us now try to further unravel this logic. We are dealing here with a functional explanation that 
accounts for the state of a system in relation to its environment in terms of the algorithmic process that 
has led to this state. There are three necessary conditions for a functional explanation. A behavioral 
pattern X is explained by its function Y for system Z if and only if: 3 
 
Y is an effect of X; 
Y is beneficial for Z; 
Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. 
 
The third condition needs further clarification and brings us to the distinction between genotype and 
phenotype. In biology the phenotype is the combination of the organism’s morphology and behavioral 
repertoire that determines the way in which it interacts with its environment. The organism’s 
phenotype is derived from the genotype, the genetic information that codes for the way in which the 
phenotype develops. The genotype both enables and constrains the organism’s interaction with its 
environment. The distinction between genotype and phenotype is essential to the way in which the 
                                                     
3 These conditions are derived from Elster (1979, p.28), who derives five conditions for a functional explanation 
in the social sciences. His formulation is as follows. An institution or behavioral pattern X is explained by its 
function Y for group Z if and only if: (1) Y is an effect of X; (2) Y is beneficial for Z; (3) Y is unintended by the 
actors producing X; (4) Y (or at least the causal relationship between X and Y) is unrecognized by the actors in 
Z; (5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. However, given the premise of generalized 
Darwinism, conditions 3 and 4 are superfluous. The Darwinian algorithm also works when intentionality is 
involved (Dennett 1995; Hodgson 2001; Knudsen 2001; Stoelhorst 2005b). 
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Darwinian algorithm works. Over time, there needs to be a causal feedback loop from the phenotype 
to the genotype. In biology, this causal feedback loop is provided by differences in reproductive 
success. The fact that some organisms are more successful in propagating their genes will change the 
composition of the genotype from one generation to the next. 
 
The distinction between genotype and phenotype is a fundamental part of a Darwinian explanation. 
For the Darwinian algorithm to work, there must be way to retain information about what has worked 
in the past, and this information must underwrite the way in which a system interacts with its 
environment. It follows that we need to understand open, complex systems in terms of the way they 
interact with their environment, or their behavior, and in terms of what ‘codes’ for that behavior, or 
their codex.4 This codex can be understood as the accumulated information about what has worked in 
the past. The notion of ‘Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z’ can thus be 
generalized to: the relative success of different behaviors in the interaction with the environment 
changes the codex of the system so that the likelihood that the system displays successful behaviors 
increases. 
 
We now have all the necessary building blocks to generalize the Darwinian logic. These building 
blocks are (1) the Darwinian algorithm consisting of the interplay between variation-selection-
retention mechanisms; (2) the genotype/codex – phenotype/behavior distinction; (3) the three 
necessary conditions for a functional explanation, central to which is the feedback loop. Figure 1 
shows how these building blocks combine to explain how open, complex systems become adapted to 
their environment. 
                                                     
4 We adopt this term from Wilkins (2001). 
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Figure 1: A generalized Darwinian framework  
 
The logic of the figure is as follows. Open, complex systems consist of different components and need 
resources from their environment to function. To secure the necessary resources an open system needs 
to interact with its environment. This interaction is what we call behavior, the act of doing something 
to have an effect upon the outside world (cf. Plotkin 1994, p.104). The system is subjected to selection 
pressure to the extent that the resources it requires to survive are scarce. Information on the ways of 
interacting with the environment that work and don’t work is fed back into the system and 
accumulated in its codex (the top part of the feedback loop from environment to system). Decoding 
this accumulated information in reaction to internal or external cues makes it more likely that 
behaviors that were successful in the past are repeated in future interactions with the environment. The 
codex of a system is a necessary source of stability in the evolutionary process. Complex systems 
consist of interacting components and necessarily involve information that specifies the components of 
the system and a design that specifies the way they interact. Random changes in these specifications 
are more likely to negatively affect the functional integrity of the system than to improve its 
performance. Yet in the long run, there needs to be a way for the system to vary its behavior if it is to 
be able to adapt to changing environmental conditions. Such variation can only result from changes in 
the system’s codex, either by changing the components that make up the system, or by changing the 
way they interact. These changes can either be blind, or informed by the nature of the selection 
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pressures faced by the system (in which case the bottom part of the feedback loop from the 
environment to the system comes into play). 
 
3. THE FIRM AS A DARWIN MACHINE 
 
We have so far argued (1) that knowledge and adaptive fit are one and the same concept, (2) that 
generalized Darwinism offers a rigorous theory to explain adaptive fit, and, by extension, knowledge, 
and (3) that learning can therefore be understood as a Darwinian process. Darwin machines learn as a 
result of the interplay of variation, selection and retention mechanisms. This interplay establishes a 
feedback loop by which information about the success of behavioral interactions with the environment 
is encoded in the system so that cues that trigger future interactions are more likely to result in 
functional behavior. 
 
Two questions were posed in the introduction of this paper: how do organizations learn and where 
does the resulting organizational knowledge reside? On the basis of the discussion in the first part of 
the paper, we can now answer these questions, albeit in very general terms. Organizations learn as the 
result of the interaction of variation, selection and retention mechanisms, and organizational 
knowledge resides in the codex of the organization. To consider the firm as a Darwin machine, the 
task we face is to detail the nature of the mechanisms of variation, selection and retention that shape 
the firm’s evolution, as well as the nature of the codex that provides for stability in the firm’s 
interaction with the environment over time. 
 
This is not unlike the task that Nelson and Winter set themselves in ‘An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Growth’, and this will therefore serve as the natural starting point of an attempt to consider 
the firm as a Darwin machine. However, as will become clear below, when considered in light of the 
Darwinian framework discussed above, there are a number of ambiguities in Nelson and Winter’s 
treatment of organizational change. Additional insights in organizational learning and the codex of the 
firm can be derived from a number of other sources whose perspective on organizational change is 
different from that of Nelson and Winter, yet compatible with the notion of the firm as a Darwin 
machine. We will consider the work of Penrose (1959) on the growth of the firm, and Burgelman 
(1991) on internal corporate venturing. For each of the theories discussed we ask the following 
questions: What does the theory suggest about the mechanisms of variation, selection and retention 
that drive organizational change and adaptation? And what does the theory suggest about the nature of 
the codex of the firm, or in other words, the elements that make up the firm and the way in which 
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these elements interact to enable functional behavior? Tables 1 and 2 summarize the discussion that 
follows. 
 

























Table 1: The Darwinian algorithm 
 
 
  Elements of 
the codex 
Interaction of 








Routines ? Profitability 
of activities 








Table 2: The Darwinian causal logic  
 
3.1. Nelson and Winter: Genes, routines, and organizational memory 
When discussing the way in which Nelson and Winter’s work helps us understand the process of 
organizational learning we should first of all note that it was not developed for this particular purpose. 
Nelson and Winter set out to develop a theory of economic change that is first and foremost concerned 
with explaining phenomena at the level of industries. Yet, one of their important achievements was 
that they grounded their theory in a rich discussion of the inner workings of the firm, and another that 
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they framed this discussion in explicitly Darwinian terms.5 We may therefore also expect their work to 
shed some light on the questions that concern us here.  
 
Given their explicit use of Darwinian terminology, let us first consider what Nelson and Winter say 
about the mechanisms of variation, selection and retention that shape organizational change. The 
central concept in Nelson and Winter’s work is that of an organizational routine. Routine is their 
‘general term for all regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms’ (p. 14), and it is this regular, 
predictable and recurrent behavior that is the centerpiece of an evolutionary logic in which ‘routines 
play the role that genes play in biological evolution’ (p.14). In other words, routines provide the 
necessary stability in behavior over time that is required for the Darwinian algorithm to work. More 
specifically, it is by exercising routines that an organization retains its productive knowledge. In 
addition, of course, there needs to be a consistent selection pressure and a source of variation. The first 
is provided by the scarcity of resources for which firms compete in the market, and the second by 
higher level ‘search’ routines by which firms look for ways to modify their lower level ‘operating’ 
routines. 
 
How does this view of the firm map unto the Darwinian logic discussed above? Unfortunately, this is 
not at all clear. As has been pointed out elsewhere, there are some ambiguities in Nelson and Winter’s 
treatment of routines (Hodgson 2002; Becker 2005). If routines were the analogue to genes, we would 
expect them to be what codes for functional behavior and not to be defined in terms of the behavior 
itself, as Nelson and Winter do. The notion of ‘routines as genes’ would mean that we are talking 
about the firm’s codex, yet the definition of routines as recurrent patterns of behavior immediately 
shifts our focus to what is actually selected by the market. In other words, the notion of organizational 
routines conflates the codex and behavior of the firm. What we are left with is a view of the firm as a 
set of recurrent action patterns that are subject to selection by the market. What the source of variation 
in these patterns is, or how they are retained through time, is not clear. 
 
Whereas it is easy to distill the three Darwinian mechanisms from Nelson and Winter’s work, it is not 
immediately clear how we can derive insights about the codex of the firm from their work. To better 
understand the nature of the codex we need to specify both the sources of variety and the sources of 
stability in the behavior of firms. Merely using the notion of routine as shorthand for the claim that 
there is such stability over time will not do. Rather, we have to unearth the actual mechanisms that 
give rise to recurrent action patterns (Becker, 2005). Nor does invoking higher-level routines as a 
                                                     
5 This is despite calling their theory Lamarckian. For a convincing discussion of why Nelson and Winter’s work 
can be appropriately viewed as Darwinian see Hodgson (2002).  
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source of change in lower level routines help much in understanding the source of variety in the 
behavior of firms. This is a way of hiding individual behavior and initiative in the folds of an infinite 
regress of ever-higher levels of routines. This way of treating the sources of variety is ironic for a 
theory that professes to be ‘unabashedly Lamarckian’ (p.11), because it does away with the need to 
incorporate intentional behavior in an explanation of how firms learn. In fact, as the nature of their 
formal models shows, the resulting explanatory logic works equally well with an entirely stochastic 
generation of variety. By modeling the codex of the firm in terms of a hierarchy of routines and by 
thus putting all the explanatory power of the theory in the collective phenomenon of routines, the role 
of individual behavior in shaping the actual behavior of firms is lost. 
 
The fact that Nelson and Winter conflate codex and behavior and view the codex of the firm in terms 
of a hierarchy of routines is best understood in light of their goal to construct quantitative models of 
industry-level phenomena. There is a notable difference between these modeling efforts and the so-
called ‘appreciative theorizing’ in the first chapters of their book. The problematic notion of routines 
in fact hides a much more subtle discussion of the internal workings of the firm that can give us some 
more detailed pointers to the mechanisms that may account for the simultaneous stability and change 
in the behavior of firms. In their discussion of ‘routine as organizational memory’ they discuss 
individual members of the organization as the locus of much of the information that is required for the 
performance of organizational routines, but emphasize that organizational memory is not reducible to 
the memories of individuals. This would ‘overlook, or undervalue, the linking of those individual 
memories by shared experiences in the past, experiences that have established the extremely detailed 
and specific communication system that underlies routine performance’ (p. 105). 
 
This seems to establish two points. First, individual behavior does matter in understanding the routines 
of firms. Second, individual behavior can become part of a recurrent pattern of coordinated behavior 
by responding to an ‘extremely detailed and specific communication system’. It would seem that it is 
this communication system that we need to unravel to really understand the nature of the codex that 
provides the stability in coordinated behavior. This idea is reinforced by Nelson and Winter’s remark 
that to establish a new routine where non exist before, ‘organization members have to learn the system 
of coordinating messages. They may have to add new skills to their individual repertories, and they 
need to achieve a first reconciliation of their expectations regarding the distribution of costs and 
benefits in the new situation’ (p.112).  
 
The comment about a reconciliation of expectations relates to their discussion of ‘routine as truce’. 
Again we see an explicit consideration of how individual behavior becomes part of a coordinated 
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action pattern. Whereas the ‘routine as organizational memory’ considers the cognitive aspect of how 
individuals behave (do they know what to do, and how to do it), the ‘routine as truce’ considers the 
motivational aspect (do they actually choose to do what is required of them in the routine operation of 
the organization as a whole). Nelson and Winter emphasize that ‘routine operation should not be 
confused with performance according to the nominal standards of the organization’ (p.108). ‘The 
usual mechanisms of internal control are, of course, a part of the context that helps define the de facto 
contracts that individual members make with the organization’ (p.108-9). But ‘[w]hat signals the 
existence of an accommodation is not the conformity of behavior to standards of performance laid 
down by supervisors or codified in job descriptions, but that members are rarely surprised at each 
other’s behavior …’ (p.108). ‘In routine operation, the combined effect of the rule-enforcement 
mechanism and other motivators is such as to leave the members content to play their roles in the 
organizational routine – but content only in the sense that they are willing to continue to perform up to 
their usual standard …In short, routine operation involves a comprehensive truce in intra-
organizational conflict’ (p.110). 
 
We may conclude that Nelson and Winter’s idea of routines as the building blocks of organizational 
capabilities is problematic, because both routines and capabilities are defined in terms of behavior, and 
not in terms of the knowledge that underlies and enables that behavior. The idea of a hierarchy of 
routines, while useful as a modeling tool, does not help us to unravel where organizational knowledge 
is stored so that functional behavior can be reliably repeated over time. The notion of routines as the 
genes of organizations as such does not tell us anything about how individual behaviors can become 
part of coordinated behavior patterns. However, the discussions of ‘routine as organizational memory’ 
and ‘routine as truce’ begin to convey a picture of individuals adapting to a complex 
intraorganizational environment consisting of a ‘system of coordinating messages’ (p.112), an 
‘organizational dialect’ (p.104), and ‘a peculiar symbolic culture’ (p.111). Moreover, routines can also 
take on the quality of norm or target, and be ‘imposed on a continually changing set of resources’ 
(p.113). Such ideas can be found in more developed form in the work of Penrose and Burgelman.  
 
3.2  Penrose: Resources, productive services and the administrative framework 
There is an obvious irony in discussing the work of Penrose (1959) in Darwinian terms, because she 
wrote a widely quoted critique of the invocation of biological analogies in economics (Penrose, 1952). 
But our discussion of generalized Darwinism has given us two reasons to proceed along these lines. 
First, Penrose’s main objection to the use of evolutionary analogies, that intentional behavior cannot 
be readily accommodated in an evolutionary framework, can now be seen as misconstrued. Second, 
the generalized notion of a Darwin machine makes developmental processes amenable to an 
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evolutionary analysis. Since ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ is arguably the seminal statement 
of organizational change in developmental terms, this makes it interesting to see how it maps unto the 
Darwinian logic. 
 
Although Penrose repeats her criticism of biological analogies in the introductory chapter of her book, 
she does use evolutionary terminology metaphorically. The term growth is used to denote ‘an increase 
in size or an improvement in quality as a result of a process of development, akin to natural biological 
processes in which an interacting series of internal changes leads to increases in size accompanied by 
changes in the characteristics of the growing object’ (p. 1). And ‘growth is essentially an evolutionary 
process and based on the cumulative growth of knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm’ (p. xiii). 
It is this qualitative change that is her interest, and the size of the firm is seen as ‘but a by-product of 
the process of growth’ (p.2). Her theory explains the direction of expansion of the firm as driven by its 
‘inherited resources’ (p.5) and its perception of productive opportunities, and the rate of expansion as 
limited by its capacity of experienced managerial resources.  
 
As we may expect given her criticism of biological analogy, Penrose does not explicitly develop her 
theory of the growth of the firm in terms of variation, selection and retention. She is, however, quite 
explicit about the elements of the firm that are central to her analysis of how firms change: firms are 
seen as a collection of resources governed by an administrative framework. With this definition, her 
view of the codex of the firm is immediately clear: the specific resources in the firm’s possession and 
the way in which they are administered provide stability to the firm’s activities. However, the 
resources are also the source of variety in the firm’s activities over time. This is because each resource 
can provide a variety of productive services. Whenever there is excess capacity of resources and the 
firm perceives a productive opportunity, it will expand its activities. The resources of the firm thus 
both enable and constrain its growth. 
 
Resources come in two forms: they include the employees of the organization as well as any other 
productive resources. Managerial resources are central to the argument: there needs to be an excess 
capacity of experienced managerial resources for firms to pursue new productive opportunities. The 
specific productive opportunities that are in fact pursued depend on the way managers perceive the 
competitive environment. ‘The environment is treated, in the first instance, as an ‘image’ in the 
entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities and restrictions with which he is confronted’ (p.5). This results 
in a rather voluntaristic argument. ‘[T]he environment is not something ‘out there, fixed and 
immutable, but can itself be manipulated by the firm to serve its own purposes’ (p.xiii). It is therefore 
not demand that limits the growth of firms, but the internal developmental process: ‘a firm’s rate of 
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growth is limited by the growth of knowledge within it, but a firm’s size by the extent to which 
administrative effectiveness can continue to reach its expanding boundaries’ (p. xvii). 
 
Penrose’s theory offers us a view of organizational change that differs from that of Nelson and Winter 
in a number of ways. First, whereas Nelson and Winter take their starting point in routines, or what 
firms do, the point of departure in Penrose’s analysis is resources, or what firms have. Second, 
whereas Nelson and Winter subsume individual behavior in their notion of collective routines, Penrose 
explicitly sees managerial experience and perception as the drivers of organizational change. Third, 
whereas Nelson and Winter’s firms are single product firms, Penrose’s firms are explicitly multi-
product. Fourth, while Nelson and Winter are very much concerned with how external market 
pressures mold the firm, Penrose is primarily concerned with how managers determine the size and 
shape of the firm from within. These differences lead to a view of organizational change that nicely 
complements that of Nelson and Winter by focusing on the resources underlying the activities of the 
firm and by giving more explicit attention to the role of individual perception and action in shaping 
organizational change.  
 
Restated in Darwinian terms, the firm’s resources serve as the source of stability in its activities, their 
differing productive services as a source of variety, and managerial perceptions of the environment as 
the source of selection. However, what the Penrosian theoretical structure is missing to qualify as a 
fully developed Darwinian account of learning is the feedback loop by which information on what 
works and what doesn’t work is fed back into the firm. This is already clear in the introductory 
chapter, where she addresses the ‘alleged tautological problem which some have feared is inherent in a 
theory of the growth of firms concerned only with firms that can successfully grow’ (p.7). What 
follows is a rather unconvincing argument in which she states that here concern is merely to answer 
the question: ‘assuming that some firms can grow, what principles will then govern their growth, and 
how fast and how long can they grow?’ (p.7). The rest of the book, of course, develops an admirable 
answer to this question. But the argument would have certainly gained in strength if it had also 
incorporated the population level logic of Nelson and Winter and included a more explicit analysis of 
the effects of competition between firms on their relative success. In the Penrosian view, the 
experienced manager almost takes the form of an omniscient designer. It is his ‘image’ of the 
productive opportunities in the environment that matters ‘for it is, after all, such an ‘image’ which in 
fact determines a man’s behavior; whether experience confirms expectations is another story.’ (p.5). 
However, a Darwinian account means also telling that other story. 
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3.3  Burgelman: Strategic initiatives and the internal selection environment 
Burgelman has explicitly used Darwinian terminology to address how organizations change as the 
result of intrapreneurial activity (Burgelman 1983, 1991; Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). Because his 
analyses are explicitly framed in terms of variation, selection and retention mechanisms, it is relatively 
easy to map his work unto the Darwinian logic. The source of variation in firms comes from strategic 
initiatives taken by the firm’s employees. These initiatives are selected in the internal selection 
environment of the firm, and those that are successful are retained in the firm’s official strategy. 
 
Burgelman distinguishes two types of initiatives that may play a role in shaping the activities of firms: 
there are initiatives that are induced by the official strategy of the firm, and there are so-called 
autonomous initiatives that fall outside the official strategy. The organization is seen as ‘an ecology of 
strategic initiatives which emerge in patterned ways, and compete for limited resources so as to 
increase their relative importance’ (1991, p. 240). ‘Structural and strategic contexts, together, 
constitute selection processes operating on strategic intitiatives’ (1991, p. 250). Strategic initiatives 
that succeed in attracting limited resources like managerial attention and investment funds shape 
organizational change. Successful initiatives are retained by incorporation in the official strategy of the 
organization that articulates the character, goals and domains of the organization. 
 
This view has a number of implications for our understanding of the nature of variation, selection and 
retention, as well as the nature of the codex of a firm. Most importantly, in addition to being subject to 
selection pressures from the market, the firm can itself be seen as a selection environment in which 
individuals compete for career advancement on the basis of strategic initiatives. Selection can thus be 
seen to simultaneously operate on two levels: within the firm, and on the firm as a whole. The central 
question is ‘how internal selection may combine with external selection to explain organizational 
change and survival’ (1991, p. 239). ‘The effectiveness of internal selection processes may depend on 
how closely they correspond to the selection pressures exerted by the current external environment, 
while simultaneously allowing new environments to be sought out’ (1991, p. 250). 
 
Like Penrose, Burgelman is primarily concerned with detailing how processes internal to the firm 
cause organizational change. However, in light of the Darwinian framework, there are three important 
contributions in Burgelman’s work. First, there is the recognition that in addition to the available 
resources, the details and outcome of the strategy process are important determinants of the specific 
activities undertaken by firms. Second, the account of the inner workings of the firm is explicitly 
framed in selectionist terms. Whereas Penrose seems to sidestep the inherent conflicts of interest that 
accompany the choice between the different productive services that resources can render, these are 
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central to the view of the firm as an internal selection environment. Third, Burgelman explicitly 
considers how internal selection may combine with external selection to explain organizational change 
and survival. Like Penrose, Burgelman’s view of the firm is somewhat voluntaristic. Firms can seek 
out new environments, and adapt their strategies to changing market pressures. However, such 
successful reorientations are likely to have been preceded by internal experimentation and selection 
processes. Organizations that create enough slack in their strategy process to allow for autonomous 
initiatives and hence stimulate variety are more likely to successfully adapt to changing selection 
pressures from the market. 
 
The main strength of Burgelman’s perspective is that it is explicitly multi-level and thus establishes a 
link between Nelson and Winter’s concern with selection by the market with Penrose’s concern for 
internal developmental processes. The necessary feedback loop is provided by the strategy processes 
in which the relative success of the firm’s activities is fed back into the firm’s strategy ‘based, at least 
in part, on retrospective sense making and attempts to capture top management’s learning about the 
basis for the organization’s success’ (1991, p. 243). The main weakness of Burgelman’s perspective is 
that its focus on strategy and strategic initiatives puts the explanatory burden exclusively on cognition 
and decision-making, or on what firms want to do, and abstracts from the activities that are actually 
performed. This is most obvious in his view of the firm as an ecology of strategic initiatives. What is 
missing from this view is a detailed analysis of the actual capabilities on the basis of which firms 




The first part of the paper used generalized Darwinism to better understand the nature of knowledge 
and learning. A rigorous treatment of learning as an evolutionary process shows that we need to 
logically distinguish knowledge from behavior. Knowledge is what enables functional behavior. For 
such knowledge to develop, there needs to be a source of variation in behavior, and there needs to be a 
feedback loop to what codes for that behavior. This feedback loop needs to have the effect that it 
increases the likelihood that behaviors that worked in the past are repeated in future interactions with 
the environment. Barring an omniscient designer, the Darwinian variation- selection-retention 
algorithm is both a necessary and sufficient condition for learning to occur. 
 
Knowledge-based and capabilities-based theories of the firm have typically not been much concerned 
with the causal logic of the learning process from which the firm’s productive knowledge results. If 
we want to do more than merely postulate the existence of productive knowledge, we need to 
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understand this knowledge as the result of an evolutionary process. The Darwinian framework 
suggests that to understand organizational learning as the source of productive knowledge, there is a 
logical imperative to disentangle organizational capabilities from the knowledge underlying them. 
Organizational capabilities are functional behaviors, and organizational knowledge is what enables 
those behaviors. This knowledge results from an evolutionary process, in which information about the 
functionality of different behaviors is fed back into the system in such a way that behaviors that work 
are retained. The essential task in understanding organizational learning, then, is to understand how 
organizations are able to achieve this selective retention of functional behavior. Where in the 
organization does the information about what works reside? The general term for where knowledge 
resides in the Darwinian framework developed in the first half of the paper is the ‘codex’ of a system. 
The codex can be understood as the specification of the elements of the system and the way in which 
they interact to produce functional behavior. The codex is what both enables and constrains the 
behaviors of the firm. 
 
The second part of the paper has considered three theories that offer important insights into the nature 
of the codex of a firm. Penrose provides a baseline specification of the constituents of the firm and the 
way they interact. Firms are a collection of resources and these resources are ‘bound together’ in an 
administrative framework. Resources come in two forms: they include the individual members of the 
organization and the (im)material assets that are at the firm’s disposal. These resources both enable 
and constrain the behavior that the firm is capable of. The administrative framework governs how they 
interact to produce that behavior. 
 
What is not immediately clear from the Penrosian framework is how firms are able to adapt to their 
environments and develop functional behaviors. To qualify as a theory of organizational learning, the 
theory of the growth of the firm lacks an explicit feedback loop. This feedback loop is central to the 
work of Nelson and Winter with its emphasis on selection by the market. In their formal models, the 
relative profitability of the activities of the firm determines the expansion or contraction of these 
activities. However, by simply postulating the existence of operational routines and search heuristics 
to modify these routines, Nelson and Winter’s models sidestep how this expansion or contraction is 
achieved. 
 
To better understand how information about what works becomes encoded in the firm, we need to 
look beyond the mere notion of routinized behaviors as the building blocks of organizational 
capabilities. This is in the spirit of Nelson and Winter’s appreciative theorizing, which offers some 
insights in the mechanisms that allow firms to retain behaviors that work. However, to qualify as a 
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theory of organizational learning, their evolutionary theory of economic change lacks the multi-
layered structure needed to distinguish behaviors from the knowledge that enables them. This is most 
obvious in the way in which they subsume individual behaviors in the notion of organizational 
routines. 
 
Both Penrose and Burgelman do accord the behavior of individuals the attention it deserves. In so 
doing they are able to specify more clearly what the sources of variation in the collective behavior of 
the firm are. Ultimately, the behaviors of individuals, and only these behaviors, are the sources of 
variation. While the resources of the firm can indeed provide a variety of productive services, it is the 
employees of the firm that decide how to deploy them. In the Penrosian view, this is rather simply 
determined by the perception of productive opportunities by the firm’s management. In Burgelman’s 
view, this is determined in a much more elaborate and subtle strategy process in which members of the 
organization take strategic initiatives that compete for managerial attention and resources in the 
internal selection environment of the firm.   
 
What are the implications of these views for modeling the firm in terms of the Darwinian framework? 
It would seem that we need to combine three views of the firm, which all have equal currency in 
addressing important aspects of organizational learning as a source of productive knowledge. The first 
view is of the firm as a social entity. In this view, the firm is seen as a collection of individuals, whose 
behaviors underlie the way in which the firm interacts with its environment. From this point of view, 
we need to understand how individual behaviors are coordinated into the functional and recurrent 
collective action patterns that we call organizational capabilities. The second view is of the firm as an 
economic entity. In this view of the firm, the firm is seen as an entity that competes with other entities 
for scarce resources, and whose success in this competition (or lack thereof) determines its survival 
and growth. From this point of view, we need to understand how information from the market is fed 
back into the system so that competitive behaviors that work can be retained. What connects these two 
views of the firm is the concept of the codex. In the view of the firm as a social entity, the codex is a 
source of selection pressure. It is the internal selection environment to which individuals adapt their 
behavior. In the view of the firm as an economic entity, the codex is a source of functional behavior. It 
is where organizational knowledge resides. The third view of the firm is as a managed entity. In this 
view, the codex is a target for intervention that managers can try to manipulate in order to change the 
firm’s capabilities. 
 
Given these three views of the firm and the central, yet varied, roles of the codex in them, what do the 
theories discussed above suggest about the nature of the codex? What are the constituent elements of 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-15




firms, and what determines how these elements interact to produce behavior? The essential constituent 
elements are two types of resources: the individual members of the organization and the material and 
immaterial assets that it can access. Both types of resources can provide a variety of productive 
services. The productive services that the individual members of the organization can render depend 
on their behavioral repertoires. Underlying each member’s repertoire of functional behaviors is 
individual knowledge. The administrative framework determines how the members of the organization 
and its assets interact. It serves two essential tasks: it determines both which productive services are 
called upon and how they are coordinated into collective action patterns. The first of these tasks is 
served by the firm’s strategy, or the shared purpose of its members, the second by its internal 
organization, or the collection of coordinating mechanisms to which the individual members of the 
organization respond. 
 
This results in a relatively straightforward definition of the codex of a firm. The codex of a firm is its 
specific combination of individual knowledge, assets, coordinating mechanisms, and shared purpose. 
These are what enable and constrain the behavior of the firm. They are both the source of internal 
selection pressures to which individuals adapt their behavior, and the source of the recurrent functional 
collective behaviors we call organizational capabilities. It is in these four elements of the codex that 
organizational knowledge resides. Organizations learn by either consciously or unconsciously 
changing one or more of these four building blocks, and feeding back the effects of these changes on 
the success of the firm in the market so that changes that work are retained.  
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The aim of this paper has been to show how an evolutionary perspective can both ground and help to 
further develop knowledge-based and capabilities-based theories of the firm. If we want to do more 
than merely stipulate the existence of productive knowledge we need to consider this knowledge as the 
result of a learning process. Doing so can help us better understand the locus of productive knowledge 
and the building blocks of organizational capabilities. Darwinism offers a logically consistent 
explanatory framework that is uniquely suited to deal with the theoretical complexities of learning 
processes. A Darwinian view of organizational learning shows that there is a logical imperative to 
distinguish organizational knowledge from organizational capabilities, and generalized Darwinism 
offers a framework that shows how they are linked in a recursive causal structure that explains how 
organizations learn.  
 
Darwinian logic leads to a view of the firm in which individual behavior is the only source of variation 
in organizational capabilities, but in which organizational knowledge also resides in collective 
properties of the firm such as assets, coordinating mechanisms and shared purpose. Together with 
individual knowledge, it is these organizational characteristics that are the building blocks of 
organizational capabilities. In the final analysis, organizational knowledge, capabilities, and learning 
can only be understood when we are willing to acknowledge that firms are both social and economic 
entities. As a social system firms coordinate the behavior of individuals. On this view organizational 
capabilities can be seen as recurrent collective action patterns. As an economic system firms compete 
with other firms on the basis of their capabilities. On this view organizational capabilities can be seen 
as the firm’s repertoire of functional behaviors. Few theories are able to combine these two levels of 
analysis and bridge the micro-macro divide that bedevils much of the social sciences. It has recently 
been argued that evolutionary theory offers a perspective that can be instrumental in bridging this 
divide (Richerson and Boyd, 2005), and perhaps a Darwinian view of the firm can help fulfill this 
promise. 
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